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LIBERTY AND THE POLICE POWER
By CLARENCE MANION
"Things have come to a pretty pass when a man can't wallop
his own jackass" This pungent commentary was called forth
from the late Henry Watterson many years ago by the faint but
nevertheless unmistakable tendency of statutory law to invert
the fundamental principle of American government. Mr. Wat-
terson felt that to "wallop his own jackass" was an act so totally
unrelated to the infringement of any right of his fellow citizens
that its prohibition was uncalled for.by the purpose whch had
so solemnly motivated the creation of the American State. If
he was disturbed then he would be profoundly shocked today.
The tendency which he noted has been developed to the point
where there are few if any remaining limitations upon the power
of a State legislature except in so far as that power has been con-
strued to be granted to the Federal government by the Constitu-
tion. In other words the American citizen now has practically
no rights of person or property that neither Congress nor the
State legislature may not impair by legislation. This is a most
peculiar eventuation in view of the natural rights philosophy
upon which all American government was most deliberately
founded. It seems to have been clearly understood by all Amer,
icans in 1776 that the individual citizen possessed certain rights
that governments were bound to respect. The government of
England was rejected precisely because Parliament asserted its omni-
potence and in its place the Americans substituted a government
charged solely with the duty of protecting the God-given rights
of man. "Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence"'
wrote Thomas Paine early in 1776. In an essentially wicked
world the rights of individuals are subject to constant invasion
as they certainly would not be "were the impulses of conscience
clear and uniformly and irresistibly obeyed." Paine conse-
quently maintained that the design and end of government was
"freedom and security". A few months later the Declaration of
Independence characterized this conception of the end and ob-
ject of government as "self evident" and invested our American
institution with the duty of preserving "unalienable rights".
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John Adams wrote of the Declaration that "there is not an idea
in it but what had been hackneyed in Congress for two years be-
fore", and Jefferson countered by saying that "I did not consider
it as any part of my charge to invent new ideas altogether and'
to offer no sentiment which had ever been expressed before." It
is apparent therefore that Revolutionary America considered the
Declaration of Independence to be the "common sense of the
subject". It is well.to remember too, that at this time (1776)
eleven of the thirteen original States set to work to draft their
respective constitutions. With the philosophy of the Declara-
tion of Independence accepted as the "common sense of the
subject" it will be seen that these new governments were
launched in an atmosphere of intense individualism. Their legis-
lative, executive and judicial departments were considered mere
instruments of protection for the unalienable rights of man. The
subsequent adoption of the Articles of Confederation and still
later of the Federal Constitution served merely to transfer to the
Federal government certain powers formerly exercised by the
individual States.
Through the first half of the nineteen century this concept of
the purpose of American government was never seriously de-
parted from either by the legislatures in making laws or the
courts in passing upon their validity. However, the conclusion
of the war between the States left thousands of manumitted
slaves within those jurisdictions that had attempted secession
and their presence there was undoubtedly the source of grave
temptation to Southern State legislatures. It was anticipated
that the laws of the South would assume a strongly regulatory
character with reference to the negroes, and those who had
worked for a vindication of the principles of the Declaration of
Independence through the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment
were resolved that there should be no return to negro slavery
thru the subterfuge of State law. In 1866 the F6urteenth Amend-
ment was formally made a part of the Constitution. Among
other things it provided that no State shall "deprive any person
of life liberty or property without due process of law." No
state had seriously attempted to violate the spirit of this com-
mandment prior to the Civil War. Up to this time State legis-
latures had abided by Jefferson's definition of their powers,
namely: "That their true office is to declare and enforce only
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our natural rights and duties, and take none of them from us.
No man has a natural right to commit aggression on the equal
rights of another and this is all from which the, laws ought to
resfrain him." Laboring under this conception it is inconceiv-
able that any State legislature should make any attempt upon the
life, liberty or property of a citizen unless in answer to or in
anticipation of an aggression upon the rights of one of its sub-
jects. One could still "wallop his own jackass" in America in
1866 but the Fourteenth Amendment provided that if any State
law should ever prohibit the practice of this or any other "lib-
erty" a Federal question would be raised and the validity of the
State law could be tested in the courts of the United States.
In 1878 the Supreme Court complained that "while it (the
'Due Process' clause) has been a part of the Constitution as a
restraint upon the power of the States only a few years the
docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked
to hold that State courts and State legislatures have deprived
their own citizens of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law.*********But when in the year of grace 1866 theie is
placed in the Constitution of the United States a declaration that
'no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law,' can a State make anything due pro-
cess of law which by its own legislation it chooses to declare
such? To affirm this is to hold that the prohibition to the States
is of no avail, or has no application where the invasion of private
rights is affected under the forms of State legislation. It seems
to us that a statute which declares in terms, and without more,
that the full and exclusive title of a described piece of land which
is now in A shall be and is hereby vested in B, would, if effect-
ual, deprive A of his property without due process of law within
the leaning of the constitutional provision." (Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U. S. 97.)
Just why the "full and exclusive" title of A must be given to
B before a violation of due process is evident, is not particularly
clear but after the decision in Mugler v. Kansas (123 U. S. 623) the
distinction was of no consequence. In that decision the Supreme
Court declared that "it cannot be supposed that the states in-
tended by adopting that (the fourteenth) amendment, to impose
restraints upon their powers for the protection of the safety,
health or morals of the community" In other words, as early as
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1887 the Supreme Court affirmed the proposition that a State
might take the life, liberty or property of its citizens without due
process of law and in spite of the prohibitions of the fourteenth
amendment, provided that such taking was in the general interest
of the public health, morals or safety. Said the court: "It does
not at all follow that every statute enacted o.stensibly for the
promotion of these ends is to be accepted as a legitimate exer-
tion of'the police powers of the State. There are, of necessity,
limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go.***If, there-
fore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the
public health, the public morals, or the public safety has no real
or substantial relation to these objects, or is a palpable invasion
of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the
courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution."
It is precisely at this period of American constitutional
history that the right of the "community" begins to be asserted
as superior to the right of the individual citizen. "Police power"
for the protection of the "general welfare" is henceforward em-
phasized as one of the inherent rights of the States, the four-
teenth amendment and the American philosophy of natural in-
dividual rights to the contrary notwithstanding. "This does not
evidence a revival of sentiment in favor of "States Rights", says
Professor Charles Burdick in his Law of the Amierican Constitution.
"It shows rather, taken together with the increasing regulatory
activities of the Federal Government, a gradual replacement of
that philosophy of individualism which prevailed during the
eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries by a phil-
osophy of collectivism, evidencing itself in governmental patern-
alism." (Page 561.) It is important to note however, that this
collectivistic, or more properly socialistic policy is being brought
about in spite of the letter and spirit of our American institu-
tions. Recalling the previously quoted language of Muggler v. Kan-
sqs: When does a statute "purporting to have been enacted to pro-
tect public health etc., have no real or substantial relation to
those objects" so as to be really "a palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law"? What is "reasonably asso-
ciated with the general welfare of the community" is a question
that will be answered differently by different legislatures and
variously constituted courts. It is at best a question of fact and
it is precisely the fickle attitude of the Supreme Court in deciding
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this "reasonableness" that has evoked much recent criticism of
its prerogative of nullifying legislation; a criticism that found its
crystallization in the LaFollette campaign for the Presidency.,
The unfortunate feature of Muggier v. Kansas and supporting
decisions is that it makes the welfare of the corporate community a
test for the propriety of Police Power regulation. The welfare
of the corporate community as such was never intended to be the
object of American legislation. The Declaration of Independence
and the State constitutions formulated at the same time were all
motivated by the necessity for protecting the rights of the individual
man. When all individuals were protected in the exercise of their
respective rights the welfare 'of the community would necessarily
follow as a matter of course, but it was never supposed that the
rights of the individual were to be protected or approached through
the avenues of legislation dictated by majority opinions as to
what is now and again for the "general good". To admit that
as between a "right" of the individually created man and the
"welfare of the community" the. right of man must give way, is
to decide ultimately that no citizen' has any rights that a majority
of his neighbors 1s bound to respect. Such a decision repeals the
last letter -of our constitutional experiment and makes of written
constitutions "absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit
a power in its own nature illimitable." (Marbury v. Madison.)
As late as 1876 the proper theory of the Police Power was
concisely stated by the Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois (94 U. S.
113) as follows: When one becomes a member of society he ne-
cessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual
not affected by his relations to others, he might retain.*****
This does not confer power upon the whole people to control
rights which are purely and exclusively private but it does au-
thorize the the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so
conduct himself and so use his own property as not unnecessarily
to injure another. This is the very essence of government and has
found expression in the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas"
From *this source comes the police pozwer.********'
Tq say that one may not use "his own" so as to injure "an-
other" is far different from deciding that a citizen or his property
"may be. regulated in the most miscellaneous and opportunistic
fashion to the end that the "general welfare" will be ultimately
promoted. The first is individualistic and in keeping with Amer-
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ican ideals: The last is socialistic and makes the epression
"unalienable right" a meaningless hypocrisy. VW.hen does one
so use himself or his property so as to injure others and. thus
make such use of himself or his property. the proper subjeet of
statutory prohibition? The law of Torts has worked this itu-
ation out to a nicety. Barring contracts, one is liable to another
in damages .when his performance has been the proximate cause of
that other's injury. Conversely, one is at perfect liberty to do
anything which will not be the proximate cause of :injury to an-
other or to another's property. With that liberty th'e legislature
should be powrles& to interfere. As it is at present dpplied the
Supreme Court's "Rule of Reasonableness" is a meaningless
thing calculated to bring the court into disrepute. and to relegate
in-dividu!aJ liberty to "the limbo .of forgotteri things". Many
meddlesome treedom-destroying statutes would undoubtedly fall
before the test of proximate cause, yet those essentially protect-
ive statutes would remain and these are all that should remain
in view of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and the "un-
alienable liberty" to which American government is supposed
to be irrevocably pledged.
